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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
gregations from becoming rich, but to prevent the accumulation
of real estate withdrawn from commerce, the purpose being essen-
tially the same as that of the English mortmain statute. It would
probably be more frank, more honest, to declare such conveyances
to the grantees in trust. If the effect of such a decision would be
to void such conveyances, then perhaps the legislatures would
come to the aid of those affected by revising the mortmain statutes.
- H. L. S., Jr.
EVIDENCE- CARBON COPY AS SECONDARY EVIDENCE.-P sued
D on a contract and offered as evidence a carbon copy of a letter
which he had sent to D, D failing to produce the original after
notice. It was shown that D could have secured the letter and have
brought it into court within a very short time after the notice
given in court. Held, the notice to produce the letter at the
trial was sufficient to authorize the admission of secondary evidence.
WaddelZ v. Trowbridge, 119 S. E. 290 (W. Va. 1923).
The dictum in the case, to the effect that the carbon copy was
admissible as secondary evidence, indicates that the court does
not agree with decisions of the courts of Virginia and many other
states, where a carbon copy is admissible as a duplicate original.
The trial court had refused to admit the carbon copy on the
ground that non-production of the original had not been excused.
The upper court merely reversed this desesion, on the ground that
non-production of the original had been excused, and that the
carbon copy was therefore properly admissible as secondary evi-
dence. By requiring that non-production of the original be ex-
cused, the court indicates that it does not regard a carbon copy as
a duplicate original, admissible as such, but as secondary evidence,
subject to the rules governing the admissibility of secondary evi-
dence. The law of West Virginia, if we can say that the law is a
reasonable prediction as to what the court would decide if the
question should actually come before it, may be considered as
against the admissibility of a carbon copy as a duplicate original.
This rule is not in accord with the settled law of many other
states. It is a settled rule of evidence that when a party makes out
two papers for the same purpose and to exactly the same effect,
and delivers one to the defendant, retaining one in his own posses-
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sion, in a suit in which the paper in defendant's possession would
be admissible as evidence, the paper in plaintiff's possession is
admissible as a duplicate original, without non-production of the
paper in defendant's possession being excused. Hubbard v. Rus-
sell, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 404; Jory v. Orchard, 2 Bos. & P. 39. The
Virginia court applies this rule in cases where the question is as to
the admissibility of a carbon copy, and admits the carbon copy as
a duplicate original. The rule was first recognized by the Virginia
court in a dictum. C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. F. W. Stock & Sons, 104 Va.
97, 51 S. E. 161. In later cases the court has admitted a carbon
copy as a duplicate original. Virginia-Carolina Coal Co. v. Knight,
106 Va. 674, 56 S. E. 725. See Burton v. F. A. Seifert & Co., 108
Va. 338, 61 S. E. 933. There seem to be no direct decision on the
point in West Virginia, but in a case similar to the principal case,
where the addressee was called upon to produce the original letter
and failed to do so, the court held that proper foundation was
laid for the admission of a carbon copy as evidence. Fayette Liquor
Co. v. Jones, 75 W. Va. 119, 83 S. E. 726. This case, in the neces-
sary inference to be drawn from it, is the same as the principal
case. In other jurisdictions there are many cases which are in
accord with the Virginia rule and admit a carbon copy as a dupli-
cate original. Wilkes v. S. V. Clark Coal & Grain Co., 95 Kan.
493, 148 Pac. 768; Hay v. American Fire Clay Co., 179 Mo. App.
567, 162 S. W. 666; Fed. Union Surety Co. v. Indiana Lumber &
Mfg. Co., 176 Ind. 328, 95 N. E. 1104; First Nat. Bank v. Jamieson,
63 Ore. 594, 128 Pac. 433; Goodman v. Saperstein, 115 Md. 678, 81
Atl. 695; Cole v. Elwood Power Co., 216 Pa. 283, 65 Atl. 678;
Intl. Harvester Co. v. Elfstrom, 101 Minn. 263, 112 N. W. 252.
On authority it is submitted that the Virginia and majority rule
is the better rule, and that the dictum in Waddell v. Trowbridge,
supra, should not be followed. - C. L. W.
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